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This is the post-peer-review pre-copy-editing version of a chapter published in Susannah Cornwall and 
John Bradbury (eds), Thinking Again about Marriage (London: SCM, 2015). 
 
Marriage, Gender, and Doctrine 
Mike Higton 
 
Introduction 
 In many of our churches – not least in my own Church of England – we are 
arguing about marriage, and our arguments go deep. In this chapter, I try to diagnose one 
of the deep currents of disagreement that lends energy to our arguments, and ask where 
it might take us. 
 In the first two parts of the chapter, I will provide an exposition of two recent 
official reports on marriage from the Church of England. I will highlight the ways in 
which their arguments about marriage rely upon an account of the essential 
complementarity between men and women.  
 In the third part, I will provide a brief critique of this complementarian account 
of gender, pointing to some problems with the appeals to biology and history that help 
drive it. The reports make those appeals, however, because they insist that our 
understanding of marriage should be responsive to the natures that we have been given 
in creation. I therefore turn in the fourth part to suggest an alternative way of thinking 
about what such responsiveness involves. My alternative way of thinking, I suggest, 
might lead to a rather different account of marriage’s nature and function, because it 
would be unlikely to continue appealing to the supposed essential complementarity of 
men and women. 
 In the final section of the chapter, I take a step back from this discussion, and 
suggest that one of the questions facing the Church, as its members pursue this kind of 
debate about the nature of marriage, is whether the complementarian account of gender 
is a core Christian teaching. Must we, now that our disagreements about marriage are 
forcing us to ask questions about gender with renewed urgency, define 
complementarianism as a doctrine of the Church?1 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  My exposition in sections 1 to 4 was first developed in a series of blog posts at 
mikehigton.org.uk, from 1 March to 25 April 2014. I explore some of the ideas in Section 5 
further in Higton 2016. 
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Marriage and Complementarity 
 I’m going to start with the Church of England’s official ‘Response to the 
Government Equalities Office Consultation – “Equal Civil Marriage”’ (Church of 
England 2012). In 2012, the Government published a consultation document, seeking 
views on ‘how we can remove the ban on same-sex couples having a civil marriage in a 
way that works for everyone’, while insisting that ‘no changes will be made to how 
religious organizations define and solemnize religious marriages’ (Government Equalities 
Office 2012: 1). 
 The Church of England’s formal response makes two moves that are at least 
partially independent. It argues that the proposed legislation is contrary to the ‘intrinsic 
nature of marriage’, and it argues that there will be legal problems with its 
implementation, and in particular with its guarantees about religious marriages. I will 
focus on the first of these strands (the argument about the intrinsic nature of marriage), 
because it is in that strand that the centrality to the debate of questions about gender 
becomes most clear. 
  The argument of the document can be summarized as follows. 
1. There is an essential complementarity between men and women – an ‘underlying, 
objective, distinctiveness’ (§10). 
2. The essential complementarity of men and women is biologically grounded, even 
if it is not reducible to capacity for procreation. Procreation certainly matters in 
the report. It is, according to the report, fundamental to the definition of 
marriage that the couple be ‘open to bringing children into the world as a fruit of 
their loving commitment’ (§25, my emphasis); it quotes the Common Worship 
liturgy to the effect that marriage is the ‘foundation of family life in which 
children may be born’ (§2). More precisely, marriage relies upon a ‘biological 
complementarity with the possibility of procreation’ (§6); more precisely still 
‘This distinctiveness and complementarity are seen most explicitly in the biological 
union of man and woman which potentially brings to the relationship the 
fruitfulness of procreation’ (§10; my emphasis). Procreation does not, however, 
exhaust the meaning of complementarity: ‘And, even where, for reasons of age, 
biology or simply choice, a marriage does not have issue, the distinctiveness of 
male and female is part of what gives marriage its unique social meaning’ (§10). 
3. The acknowledgement and expression of this essential complementarity of the 
sexes is therefore necessary for the flourishing of human society. Properly 
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acknowledged, complementarity will be expressed in specific and distinctive 
contributions from men and women in all social institutions. The report states 
that ‘a society cannot flourish without the specific and distinctive contributions 
of each gender’ (§12). After all, this is a fundamental reason for supporting ‘the 
deeper involvement of women in all social institutions’ (§12). This is why gender 
complementarity has been recognised and expressed in societies down the ages; it 
is ‘enshrined in human institutions throughout history’ (Summary): such 
recognition and expression serves ‘the common good of all in society’ (§4), and is 
of high ‘social value’ (§12). 
4. Acknowledging and expressing this complementarity is central to the purpose of 
marriage. ‘Marriage benefits society in many ways, not only by promoting 
mutuality and fidelity, but also by acknowledging an underlying biological 
complementarity which, for many, includes the possibility of procreation’ 
(Summary.) This is what the document means when it speaks of the ‘intrinsic 
nature of marriage as the union of a man and a woman’ (Summary), and says that 
‘marriage in general – and not just the marriage of Christians – is, in its nature, a 
lifelong union of one man with one woman’ (§1). The emphasis falls firmly on 
‘man’ and ‘woman’. Of course, there are other goods proper to marriage – 
mutuality and fidelity – but these are not at issue in this debate, nor are they 
unique to marriage (§9). ‘[T]he uniqueness of marriage – and a further aspect of 
its virtuous nature – is that it embodies the underlying, objective, distinctiveness 
of men and women’ (§10).  
5. Marriage is the primary social institution by which our society acknowledges and 
expresses this complementarity. ‘Marriage has from the beginning of history been 
the way in which societies have worked out and handled issues of sexual 
difference. To remove from the definition of marriage this essential 
complementarity is to lose any social institution in which sexual difference is 
explicitly acknowledged’ (§11, emphases mine). 
6. If marriage ceases to be a way for our society to acknowledge and express this 
complementarity, our society’s capacity to acknowledge and express it at all will 
therefore be seriously reduced, and society as a whole will be harmed. This is why 
the report describes the government proposals as constituting an attempt ‘to 
remove the concept of gender from marriage’ (Summary). And this is what is 
meant by the claim that the proposals would ‘change the nature of marriage for 
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everyone’ (Summary). It is not that the authors of the report think that the 
strength of my marriage will be undermined if other people enter into a union of 
which I disapprove. Rather, they think that marriage as an institution will be less 
capable of performing one of its most important social functions if it ceases to be 
clearly defined in gender terms. And this is also what the authors of the report 
mean when they say that the legislation will involve ‘imposing for essentially 
ideological reasons a new meaning on a term as familiar and fundamental as 
marriage’ (Summary). The ideology in question is, they believe, one in which 
‘men and women are simply interchangeable individuals’ (§12) – which is the only 
alternative the report imagines to its own account of essential gender 
complementarity. And all of this is why the report can say that this is not 
(directly) an issue about the acceptability of homosexual sexual activity, but rather 
about the fact that ‘the inherited understanding of marriage contributes a vast 
amount to the common good’, and that this will be lost, ‘for everyone, gay or 
straight’, if ‘the meaning of marriage’ is changed (§5). ‘We believe that redefining 
marriage to include same-sex relationships will entail a dilution in the meaning of 
marriage for everyone by excluding the fundamental complementarity of men 
and women from the social and legal definition of marriage’ (§13) and ‘the 
consequences of change will not be beneficial for society as a whole’ (§8). 
 
 In other words, marriage is presented in the report as the means by which we 
recognize and express an essential gender complementarity. This complementarity needs 
to be recognized and expressed not simply for the sake of marriage, but for the sake of 
society as a whole, which will only truly flourish when the specific and distinctive 
contributions from men and women are given full expression in all parts of its life. 
 
Men and Women in Marriage 
 In 2013, a follow-up to the Church’s response to the Government consultation 
appeared, in the form of a report from the Church of England’s Faith and Order 
Commission (FAOC) entitled Men and Women in Marriage (Faith and Order Commission 
2013).2 It can be read as providing a more carefully articulated expression of the theology 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I am myself a member of FAOC, and I was a member when the report was proposed, when it 
was discussed, and when it was published. As a member, I share responsibility for the report, 
even if (as is often the way with reports produced by committee) it does not represent my own 
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of gender contained in the earlier document. 
 In the Foreword, the Archbishops say that it aims to provide a ‘short summary of 
the Church of England’s understanding of marriage’ and, more fully, that 
 
It sets out to explain the continued importance of and rationale for the doctrine of the 
Church of England on marriage as set out in The Book of Common Prayer, Canon B30, the 
Common Worship Marriage Service and the teaching document issued by the House in 
September 1999 (in Faith and Order Commission 2013: v).3 
 
That description could be misconstrued, however. The Faith and Order Commission’s 
report did not provide an evenly balanced summary of all the main things that the 
Church of England has wanted to say about the nature and purpose of marriage, but was 
an attempt to set out more fully the background in the Church of England’s thinking to 
the specific arguments made in the debate about same-sex marriage. Nearly everything in 
the report is (as the title says) about the necessity of marriage’s taking place between a 
man and a woman, and about ‘how the sexual differentiation of men and women is a gift 
of God’ (§3). Other topics (including such central topics as faithfulness and public 
commitment) appear only briefly, and only insofar as they relate to that central topic. 
 Like the original response to the government consultation, then, this is a report 
about gender. It speaks about the importance of gender difference to marriage, but also 
about the wider importance of gender in society. 
 The report is arranged around a very clear central vector. It begins with creation, 
and moves towards culture. That is, it begins with sexual difference as a feature of the 
natural world (a defining feature of human biology) and then argues that human 
behaviour (our relationships, our institutions, our culture) should respect and respond to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
views. The report was, however, ‘commended for study’ by the Archbishops in their Foreword, 
and it has seemed to me that the best way for me to accept my responsibility for it is to take that 
commendation seriously: to study the report, to ask what agenda it suggests for further 
deliberation, and to pursue that deliberation vigorously. 
3 Canon B30, part of the canon law that provides the legal framework for the Church of 
England, can be found at www.churchofengland.org/about-
us/structure/churchlawlegis/canons/section-b.aspx, and the marriage service, part of its 
authorized liturgy, at www.churchofengland.org/prayer-
worship/worship/texts/pastoral/marriage/marriage.aspx. The 1999 teaching document 
mentioned in the Foreword is  Marriage: A Teaching Document (House of Bishops 1999). 
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this feature. The report is, in other words, an exercise in ‘natural law’ ethics (§9). It is an 
exercise in describing how our behaviour should be regulated so as to do justice to our 
(physical, biological, ecological) nature. ‘Not everything in the way we live, then, is open 
to renegotiation’, it says. ‘We cannot turn our back upon the natural, and especially the 
biological, terms of human existence’ (§10). 
 This argument begins with a claim made about marriage found in the Church of 
England’s marriage liturgy: that it is ‘a gift of God in creation’ (§2, 5, 6). Or, in the words 
of an earlier report (House of Bishops 2005, quoted in §2), marriage is ‘a creation 
ordinance.’ In other words, marriage is underpinned by, and gives expression to, a 
structure of the natural world (§8). And that means that it is underpinned by, and gives 
expression to, a fact about us as human beings that runs deeper than our politics, our 
economics, and our cultures (§6). It is underpinned by, and gives expression to, 
something beyond all the relativities of history: the biological fact that we are, naturally, 
sexed creatures. Our sexual differentiation is cultural as well as biological, but its 
biological aspect is fundamental, underpinning all its other aspects. This biological aspect 
is not restricted to (though it certainly includes) our capacity for differentiated 
involvement in the process of procreation (§3). 
 Marriage is, according to the report, given to us as a way of acknowledging and 
expressing this natural differentiation. The report does not use the word ‘natural’ to 
describe marriage itself. Rather, marriage is an institution that responds to nature. 
Nevertheless, the report makes it clear that to form lifelong, monogamous, exogamous 
(that is, not with relatives), male-female relationships, for the sake of reproduction and 
the nurture of children, is a primary way in which we can live in accordance with our 
biological nature. 
 When discussing the nature of marriage as lifelong, monogamous and 
exogamous, the report says that ‘most developed traditions give these three structural 
elements a central place in their practices of marriage’ (§18), and that the exceptions 
‘have tended to be of limited scope’ and ‘hardly amount to a significant challenge to 
these structural foundations’ (§19). The idea here is that history reveals nature. We can 
look at the patterns of relationship that have prevailed and flourished across multiple 
human societies, and see in them clues to the underlying natural structure to which they 
are responding. And the idea underlying that is that cultures can only truly flourish if they 
are shaped in accordance with nature. 
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 The report therefore argues that ‘we need a society in which men and women 
relate well to each other’ (§12), where the word ‘well’ clearly means ‘in accordance with 
the complementarity found in nature’. Marriage is our central means of ensuring that 
relationships between man and women achieve this goal. It is ‘a paradigm of society, 
facilitating other social forms’ (§13). Marriage (in the sense of a lifelong, monogamous, 
exogamous, male-female relationship, ordered towards procreation and family life) 
therefore ‘enriches society and strengthens community’ (§15, quoting the marriage 
service), and is ‘central to the stability and health of human society’ (§2, quoting House 
of Bishops 2005 on civil partnerships). 
 What are we to make of all this? 
 
Gender, Biology, and History 
 Let me begin with the positive. The aspects of this theology that I am most 
readily able to affirm are its insistences that to live well involves responding attentively to 
our bodiliness, and that we are not bodily in the abstract but always as particular sexed 
bodies. We receive that particularity, that differentiation, as a gift from God. As Men and 
Women in Marriage says, ‘Persons in relation are not interchangeable units, shorn of 
whatever makes one human being different from another. They are individuals who 
bring to the relationship unique experiences of being human in community, unique 
qualities, attributes and histories’ (§25). 
 I do not believe that our options reduce to complementarianism on the one hand 
(the belief that to respond adequately to our bodiliness primarily means acknowledging 
and distinguishing the essentially distinct contributions of men and women) or some 
kind of free-flowing and effectively disembodied individualism on the other (in which 
the constraints and possibilities yielded by our differently sexed bodies play no 
appreciable role, and ‘men and women are simply interchangeable individuals’, as the 
response to the government consultation says in §12). Nevertheless, the basic point 
about taking embodied difference seriously is a very important one. 
 That very affirmation, however, gives rise to serious questions. First of all: it 
gives rise to questions about what it is that we are given in our ‘nature’, and how we know 
what we have been given. The stress in Men and Women in Marriage on the biological 
underpinnings of marriage suggests that what we are given is fundamentally our 
biological constitution, and that this can be known by means of natural science. The 
words ‘biology’ or ‘biological’ turn up six times, mixed in with the thirteen occurrences 
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of ‘nature’ or ‘natural’, and there’s an explicit mention of the way in which ‘the 
marvellous ordering of the created world’ is discovered in ‘physics and biology’ (§8). This 
report was intended to communicate the Church’s understanding of marriage to a wide 
public audience, and I think the strongest message conveyed about how we arrive at that 
understanding is that it is squarely based on the scientific facts of human biology. 
 Attention to biology can certainly yield the idea that procreation requires the 
involvement of someone with male reproductive organs and someone with female 
reproductive organs, and that is certainly not a trivial matter. And yet it is – to say the 
least – questionable whether attention to biology will underpin the broader claims of the 
report. After all, attention to the facts of human biology doesn’t yield a neat 
differentiation of male and female characteristics (see further Susannah Cornwall’s and 
Ben Fulford’s chapters in this volume); it doesn’t yield the idea that all the human beings 
that God has created can be neatly divided into ‘men’ and ‘women’ (see further Raphael 
Cadenhead’s chapter); and it doesn’t yield the idea that lifelong, monogamous, 
exogamous relationships are biologically natural in a way that other patterns of 
relationship are not. More appears to be being built on biology in the report than it can 
bear, and biology on its own would seem to push us to rather more complex conclusions 
than this report allows. 
 The argument does not, however, rely exclusively upon this appeal to biology. 
There is also an appeal to history. Both Men and Women in Marriage and the earlier 
document suggest that we can look at the patterns of relationship that have prevailed 
through history, and see in them clues to the underlying natural structure to which they 
respond, a structure that is itself beyond the relativities of history. 
 Yet history both reveals and conceals nature. We are indeed called to respond 
attentively to our bodiliness, and we are indeed not bodily in the abstract but always as 
particular sexed bodies. True flourishing does require some such responsiveness, as the 
reports suggest. Furthermore, we do only know the nature of our bodiliness, including 
our sexed bodiliness, through the ways in which we have responded to it through history. 
That is, we know the constraints that our sexual differentiation imposes upon us and the 
possibilities that it creates for us only by knowing how it has been registered as constraint 
and as possibility in specific ways by human beings in our history together. 
 And yet it is also important to acknowledge that all of those historical responses 
are inadequate, and open to challenge. We can’t point to any historical example and say, 
‘Here is where we see the constraints and possibilities of sexed bodily existence 
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registered truly and completely.’ We have become increasingly aware in recent years that 
our history is in large part a history of the misidentification of the constraints and 
possibilities that our sexed bodily existence yields – whether we have claimed that having 
a female body obviously means a moral and intellectual incapacity for the serious 
business of voting, or that girls are naturally interested in pink toys and boys in blue. 
 The brief reliance in the reports upon the history of our responses to sexed 
bodily nature suggests that those responses tend very largely to fall into one groove. They 
are canalized by the shape of the underlying biological landscape over which they are 
flowing. Yet it is far from clear that the diversity and complexity of our history reduces 
to the canalized form suggested in the report: that there is one main groove into which 
marriage has fallen in human history, and that the various exceptions to that groove have 
been (as Men and Women in Marriage says) ‘of limited scope’. It is equally clear that where, 
for large parts of our history, our marriage practices have fallen into a groove, that it has 
seldom been something to celebrate without reserve (as Charlotte Methuen notes in this 
volume). The grooves into which our practices have fallen have very often been deathly. 
 The appeals to biology and history in the reports are, therefore, problematic. The 
problems with them are not simply technical problems, however, of interest only to 
academic theologians. They have sharp edges that intrude deeply into everyday life. We 
have, after all, a very, very bad history of appealing to nature and to history when 
speaking about the proper roles and relations of men and women. We have a toxic, 
death-dealing history. We have used appeals to the ‘obvious’ facts of biology, and appeals 
to the ‘obvious’ lessons of history, to oppress and to abuse. And that history is not a tale 
of long ago and far away; it is all around us still. 
 We live in a world, and continue to make a world, in which we restrict the lives of 
women and of men by telling them fables about what is naturally appropriate to them 
thanks to their gender. We continue to build a world in which toxic myths about ‘normal’ 
family life are used to exclude and to demean – to underwrite our poisonous profligacy 
in naming others’ relationships as inadequate or dysfunctional or unnatural or 
malformed. We continue to build a world in which we use our valorization of marriage, 
as a bond forged from links that are prior to law and culture, to mark out spaces in which 
violent abuse can hide. 
 What our problematic history reveals is that our attempts to register and respond 
to our bodiless are fallible and fraught, and that we are far from done with the process of 
learning to respond well. We do not yet know what it means to respond truly to our 
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sexual differentiation – but to understand the import of that realization for our thinking 
about marriage, we need to change the terms of our discussion, and shift from talking 
about the relationship between biology and history to talking about on the relationship 
between creation and redemption. 
 
Redeeming Creation 
 Men and Women in Marriage quotes the Common Worship marriage service to the 
effect that ‘as man and woman grow together in love and trust, they shall be united with 
one another in heart, body and mind, as Christ is united with his bride, the Church’ 
(§39), and then expands that to say, ‘The encounter of man and woman in marriage 
affords an image, then, of the knowledge and love of God, to which all humans are 
summoned, and of the self-giving of the Son of God which makes it possible’ (§40). A 
little earlier, it had spoken of marriage’s attaining ‘a permanence which could speak to the 
world of God’s own love’ and of this as a matter of our species’ ‘spiritual vocation’ (§33). 
 In other words, the report presents marriage as a means by which human beings 
learn to embody and to communicate God’s love, and suggests that marriage can be a 
sharing in, a participation in, a love that is prior to it: God’s own Christlike love. God’s 
love is marriage’s context and goal, and that love therefore defines marriage. Marriage is, 
fundamentally, ordered towards Christlike love. 
 To run with these ideas, however, might take us in a rather different direction 
from that marked out by these reports. We are, these ideas suggest, not simply called to 
live in attentive response to our bodiliness, but to live in attentive response to our 
bodiliness in the light of God’s love for the world in Jesus Christ. Christian ethics, then, is not 
simply about conformity to creation, but about creaturely participation in redemption. 
Redemption is the fulfilment of creatureliness, so that the route to true response to our 
created nature is by participation in redemption. Redemption does not abolish or 
override but brings to fruition our creatureliness. Creation and covenant belong together, 
because the Creator is also the Redeemer. 
 The call to live in response to our created natures is not, therefore, to be thought 
of primarily as the imposing of a constraint already known or knowable to us without 
regard to redemption. It is the call to discover together the possibilities of godly growth 
and transformation that our created natures give us. It is the call to discover the 
particular forms of flourishing that our bodies make possible, and to discover the 
particular ways in which we, as these particular bodies, can become by the Spirit’s work 
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conformed to Christ, and so become particular icons of God’s love, communicating that 
love in a way that no other bodies could. 
 That transformation might therefore be thought of as a craft, working with the 
grain of the material at hand to make something beautiful, something that speaks ever 
more clearly of God’s love. It is a transformation that happens under the discipline of 
the material with which we are working and under the discipline of the word that we are 
called to let that material speak, the word of Christlike love. But those two disciplines are 
inextricable: we only discover the true nature of the material with which we are working 
as we discover how it can speak this word. Our ‘nature’ is not a neutral biological fact: it 
is the particular possibility that we have been given in creation of communicating the 
love of God, and we will discover that possibility in it only as we discover how to 
communicate that love. 
 
A Matter of Doctrine? 
 My language is meant to suggest that this task of disciplined discovery is an 
ongoing one. That is, I am deliberately suggesting that we are still in the process of 
discovering the ways of speaking about and responding to sexual difference to which we 
are called by the good news of God’s love in Jesus Christ. And that means that I am 
deliberately suggesting that our accounts of and practices of marriage are also properly a 
matter of ongoing discovery. And by saying all this, I am suggesting that the answers to 
that question are not already clear to us. God has given us marriage, but that gift is one 
that we are still receiving. 
 This does not mean that ‘anything goes’, or that marriage can mean whatever we 
feel like letting it mean. The process of discovery that I am suggesting is a matter of 
spiritual discipline, and of growth in holiness. It will be informed by a careful 
attentiveness to the full complexity of what scientific investigation can show us, but we 
will not simply be able to read off our answers from the results of such investigation. It 
will be informed by a careful attentiveness to the full complexity of the history of human 
practice in this area, even if much of that attentiveness will take the form of the penitent 
discernment of sinful distortions. Most importantly, however, it will be informed by our 
attentiveness to what we learn of the love to which we are called from Christ and Christ’s 
witnesses, and by the purification of our distorted loves in prayer and worship. 
 I have also been suggesting – though I realize that I have done no more than 
suggest, and that I have certainly not demonstrated my claim – that these explorations 
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will be likely to lead us somewhere different from the complementarian understandings 
of gender found in these two church reports, and from the gender-focused account of 
marriage that is built on that foundation. Both of the reports that I have analyzed, 
however, strongly suggest that the Church does not have the freedom to take its 
exploration of marriage in that direction. As Men and Women in Marriage says, ‘Not 
everything in the way we live, then, is open to renegotiation’ (§10). Most directly, the 
Church’s response to the government consultation on same-sex marriage claims that its 
understanding of marriage is ‘a matter of doctrine’, ‘derived from the teaching of Christ 
himself’ (§1), ‘derived from the Scriptures’, and ‘enshrined within [the Church of 
England’s] authorised liturgy’ (§2). It strongly suggests, therefore, that the whole 
complementarian account of gender that it sets out is itself such a ‘matter of doctrine’.  
 One way of construing the debate within the Church of England is as a debate 
about precisely this claim. Is gender complementarianism a doctrine of the Church? 
After all, whilst it is clearly true that the Church of England has consistently assumed 
that marriage involves a man and a woman, it has not before been brought before to face 
squarely the question of why that is so, and whether it has to be so, and it has not been 
brought before to face squarely the question of the status of the account of gender that 
the reports believe underpins that assumption about marriage. One could therefore see 
the debate as pushing for a decision on this matter: a decision on whether these claims 
about gender (and so about marriage) are properly a matter of doctrine. 
 To ask this question is not, I suggest, quite the same as asking whether this 
account of gender is true. There are many true things that are not properly doctrines of 
the Church. The Church might be united in believing that Canterbury is to the south of 
York, and might rely upon this assumption in numerous documents, and we may be 
satisfied by every means proper to the investigation of such a claim that it is true. That 
does not make this claim properly part of the Church’s doctrine. To see whether it 
should be counted as doctrine of the Church, we need to ask not just whether it is true, 
but whether the Church has to teach this truth in order to be faithful to its calling to 
proclaim the gospel in word and deed. 
 It is not enough to find that a teaching is present in tradition or in Scripture; it is 
not enough to find that a teaching is consistent in tradition or in Scripture; it is not even 
enough to find that a teaching is pervasive in tradition or in Scripture. To be given the 
status of a doctrine of the Church – a formal claim about the proper limits of our 
explorations – a teaching must satisfy a further condition. It must be necessary to support 
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the Church’s proclamation of the good news of Jesus Christ. The motto for the process 
of determining such doctrinal limits could therefore be provided by 1 Corinthians 2:2: ‘I 
decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified.’  
 Consider (to give an unrelated example) Christian disagreements about the 
doctrine of creation. I do not believe that we are required to teach, as a doctrine of the 
Church, that the earth was created some thousands of years ago, in a sequence of six 
days aptly described by the opening chapter of Genesis. This is not because Genesis 1 is 
poetic in nature, nor because these elements of the Genesis narrative are clearly culturally 
determined. Rather, these claims about creation cannot be counted as doctrines of the 
Church because they are not germane to the gospel. If we were to claim them as authoritative 
Christian teachings – as matters of doctrine – then we would have to regard them as 
authoritative Christian teaching in addition to the gospel. We would have to say, in our 
catechesis, ‘Do you believe that, in Jesus, God was reconciling the world to Godself – 
and do you also believe this other thing: that the earth was created in six days some 
thousands of years ago?’ By contrast, to say ‘I believe in God . . . creator of heaven and 
earth’ is a doctrine of the Church, because it has been shown to be part of what we need 
to say if we want to say ‘Jesus is Lord’ with full seriousness, in the light of Scripture. 
Jesus is Lord of all the earth, because the earth is his; redemption in Christ is the 
fulfilment of our creaturely natures because we were made in, through and for him. 
 Similarly, therefore, in the Church’s debates about marriage, the key question in 
determining the proper limits of our explorations is, ‘What is germane to the gospel in 
what our faith says about gender?’ What do we need to say about this topic in order to 
go on saying ‘Jesus is Lord’? I have suggested that our explorations can and should take 
us beyond complementarian accounts of gender, because I can’t currently see that those 
accounts could be anything other than additions to the gospel, were we take them to be 
authoritative Christian teachings. That is, if they were to be held out as authoritative for 
Christians it could only be because we said, in our catechesis, ‘You must believe that, in 
Jesus, God was reconciling the world to Godself – and you must also believe this other 
thing: that men and women have essentially complementary ways of being.’ If that is 
true, then we cannot and must not regard complementarianism as a matter of doctrine. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Church of England’s debates about marriage (and the debates of other 
churches too, perhaps) are deeply bound up with patterns of thinking about gender. 
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They are bound up with questions about the proper responsiveness of our habits of 
thought, speech, and action to our embodied sexual differentiation, and about what the 
good news of redemption in Christ demands of us in this area. 
 In our debates, questions have been raised forcefully and insistently about an 
existing answer – the complementarian answer – and defences no less forceful and 
insistent given. Yet however pervasive that answer is and has been, however deep its 
roots, however much its supporters can appeal to Scripture and tradition in its defence, it 
cannot properly be claimed as a necessary teaching of the Church if we have not 
determined that it is required of us by the nature of redemption. That is, now that weighty 
onslaughts have been launched against it, it can only properly stand as an authoritative 
limit upon the acceptable exploration and development of our accounts and practices of 
gender if it can be made clear that to deny it would be to deny the good news of God’s 
gracious love for the world in Jesus Christ. 
 We are called, as I said above, to the intense and demanding work of discovering 
together the particular possibilities of godly growth and transformation open to us, the 
particular ways in which we can be conformed by the Spirit to Christ to become icons of 
God’s love, as the particular sexually differentiated bodies that we are. Our debates about 
marriage are, at least in part, debates about what accounts of gender are demanded of us, 
or permitted to us, in the context of serious commitment to this task. 
 Despite the length and volume of the arguments about marriage and sexuality in 
my Church, these questions, about the demands of Christian holiness in the realm of 
gender, are ones that demand much more intensive attention and debate. We may have 
been arguing about sexuality and gender for ages, but our arguments still have much 
deeper to go. 
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